43 years of fighting in the Orsha direction. Liberation of Orsha. Fragment of a map of the pre-war station Orsha

Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 is the most destructive war in human history. The military aggression that Nazi Germany treacherously began on June 22, 1941, disrupted the peaceful life of the Soviet people. In a short time, the Soviet Union turned into a single powerful monolith of the front and rear. The chronicle of the heroic and tragic history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi aggressors began - a war on the altar of which the country sacrificed millions of lives, stopping the spread of the “brown plague” of German Nazism not only in European countries, but throughout the world. The Soviet Union became the main obstacle to the implementation of Nazi Germany's aggressive aspirations for world domination. The German leadership hoped to destroy the country with a lightning strike, seize its enormous human, material and natural resources, and turn millions of Soviet people into obedient slaves. In this merciless struggle, the Soviet people defended not only their freedom and independence, but also the sovereignty of European countries. It was the Soviet-German front that became the main line of confrontation, where the fate of the whole world was decided. More than three-quarters of the armed forces of Germany and its European allies were deployed here.

The war, which became one of the most important events in world history, brought countless sacrifices, suffering and destruction to the entire Soviet people. In its cruel, insatiable fire, the greatest losses and destruction of all Soviet republics fell to the lot of Belarus. For more than three years from 1941 to 1944, the Belarusian people languished under the yoke of enemy occupation. And only by the summer of 1944, a favorable situation developed on the Soviet-German front for the offensive actions of the Red Army, which firmly held the strategic initiative. The Soviet troops were tasked with defeating the central group of German troops - Army Group Center, liberating Belarus and reaching the state border of the USSR.

June 23, 1944 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky, for almost a year, which stood less than 40 km east of Orsha, began to move. The operation to defeat the Nazi troops in Belarus began. The liberation of Vitebsk and Orsha was the task of the first stage of the operation, codenamed “Bagration”, named after the Russian hero of the war of 1812, who died on the Borodino field. The goal of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, which was carried out from June 23 to 28, 1944, was to defeat the troops of the left wing of the Nazi Army Group Center, defending in the Vitebsk-Lepel and Orsha directions. During this operation, Soviet troops advanced 80-150 km and encircled 5 enemy divisions in the Vitebsk area. The German command considered its defense in Belarus invincible.

Powerful defensive fortifications were created everywhere 25-30 kilometers from the front line. The trenches were reinforced with pillboxes, bunkers, wire barriers of 2-4 stakes, anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields. German units constantly improved their fire system, shooting through every meter of land in front of their front line. Theoretically, it was impossible to walk, crawl, or fly here.

The rear lines ran along the Orshitsa and Dnieper rivers to the village of Kopys. The latter was a system of trenches and reinforced concrete pillboxes. Exceptional attention was paid to strengthening Orsha itself. The city was surrounded by a perimeter of 2-3 trenches, reinforced with 40-50 pillboxes and bunkers. Stone buildings were adapted for defense, and the streets were dug in with ditches. Civilians were herded into concentration camps in Orsha and worked in unbearable conditions to build a defensive rampart. The roads were littered with the dead.

To build the Panther defensive rampart, tens of thousands of residential buildings and buildings were dismantled... For each section of the front in the area from Dubrovno to Kopys, there were 500 bayonets of personnel, 50 machine guns and 22 enemy guns per kilometer. This once again proved that a real impregnable fortress was built here. In addition, the German command took a subscription from all personnel: to die, but not to retreat without an order...

Assessing those distant events today, you realize that it really was a battle for life and death. Our losses were also enormous. During attacks, Soviet regiments lost up to 90% of their personnel per day. And the enemy, with sophisticated cynicism, filled the gaps of free defense with our citizens, hiding behind them like a human shield.

In the Memorial Museum of Hero of the Soviet Union K.S. Zaslonov contains the memoirs of Major D. Saulin (3rd Belorussian Front), one of the participants in the Battle of Orsha, in which he describes in detail the events of those heroic days:

“The German command entrusted the defense of the fortifications on the approaches to Orsha to the most combat-ready and selected divisions of the 4th Army. This included the 57th, 78th, 26th Infantry and 25th Motorized Divisions. The average strength of these divisions was 750 people. The firepower and tactical density of the defense can be judged from the following data. On the Osintorf-Mikhalinovo section there were 120 assault guns, 80 tanks and 80 anti-aircraft guns. In total there were up to 550 guns.

However, thanks to well-organized reconnaissance, our command had comprehensive data on the enemy’s grouping, strength, location of its troops, characteristics of structures along the entire operational depth of defense, as well as on the fire system of artillery and automatic weapons. It was important to deliver the main blow north of the Minsk highway in a forested and swampy area. At the same time, a demonstrative offensive was planned along the entire front. The German command did not even allow the thought that our offensive would be carried out over difficult terrain. Meanwhile, it was here that our troops could bypass the main fortifications from the north and reach Orsha. Dealing the main blow in this sector, that is, on the weak link of the defense in the direction of Ostrov-Yuryev, Orekhi-Vydritsa, the advancing troops separated the 78th assault division of the Germans into two isolated groups, creating the threat of destroying them in parts. It should be noted that, among other things, this offensive made it possible to achieve success with great savings in manpower.

On June 23, after powerful artillery and air bombardment of the enemy’s front line, headquarters and rear areas, Red Army units went on the offensive. They immediately captured the first trench, and in some areas the second. The Germans brought into battle the regimental and divisional reserves of the 78th Assault Division, reinforced with tanks and self-propelled guns, but were unable to restore the situation. Then the enemy brought two infantry divisions into action, launching counterattacks in the direction of Babinovichi. This also came to nothing. By the end of this day, our units operating in the direction of Orehi-Vydritsa had broken through the enemy’s defenses up to 4 km and advanced to a depth of 6 km. The pace of advance was slowed down by difficult terrain. In a number of cases, the infantry had to pull the guns by hand. However, the offensive stubbornly moved forward, knocking the Germans out of the fortifications, besieging the left flag of the 78th Assault Division. Later it became known that the commander of this division appealed to his command to withdraw units to an intermediate line, but was refused. During June 24, units of the Red Army, having captured the first line of German defense north of the highway, approached the second one and broke through it in some areas.

The second wedge in the enemy’s defense in the Ostro-Yuryev, Orehi-Vydritsa direction was expanded along the front to 15 km and deepened to 16 km. By the middle of this day, numerous groups of our infantry with tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive from the forest in the Orehi-Vydritsa area .

With the support of artillery and aviation, they began to bypass the flank and rear of one of the regiments of the 78th German division. The command of the 27th Army of the German Corps tried to counterattack and overturn the attacking battle formations.

Despite the fact that large forces of infantry and tanks took part in the counterattack, the enemy was not successful. The German 26th Infantry Division, operating north of the 27th Army Corps, was by this time crushed and thrown back south to the Luchos River. As for the units of the 25th Motorized Division and the 110th Infantry Division, located to the south, they still continued to hold their positions. In the battles that broke out the next day, that is, June 25, our units in the area north of Orsha repelled numerous counterattacks, which were carried out by forces up to an infantry regiment, supported by tanks and self-propelled guns. At the same time, our attack increased. The enemy's rear defense line was broken through, and our troops advanced 15-20 km. Soviet mobile units poured into the resulting breakthrough and entered the operational space. At this stage of the battle, the Germans threw the main last army reserve into battle in the direction of Orehi-Vydritsa. Encounter battles ensued, during which the enemy suffered heavy losses and was overthrown. Rapidly developing their success, the Soviet troops did not allow the enemy to gain a foothold in pre-prepared intermediate positions. The captured commander of the assault 78th division, Lieutenant General Trout, therefore said the following: “The Russians were hot on our heels. In many places they occupied new positions simultaneously with the advancing German units.”

As it turned out, Trout himself, fearing to finally lose his 195th regiment and reinforcements, gave the order to hastily retreat. This subsequently led to the exposure of the flank and rear of the German units defending south of the Dnieper. On the night of June 26, these enemy units, under the attacks of our troops, began to retreat beyond the Dnieper. Further events developed as follows: on the afternoon of June 26, our mobile units captured Kokhonovo and cut the railway and highway, the 27th German Corps lost its supply routes. This building found itself in a semi-encirclement.

As for the units of the 6th German Corps, they retreated to the west in disarray. By the evening of this day, our mobile units broke through to Orsha from the northwest and west. The fall of Orsha was a foregone conclusion. The 78th German division, having used up its reserves, continued a disorderly retreat, trying to hide behind rearguards - troops that were supposed to protect the rear of the main forces from enemy attack. But the onslaught of our units intensified. Having destroyed the rearguards and barrage detachments, they took Orsha by storm on June 27. The remnants of the German divisions were transported across the Dnieper, deprived of railroads and highways, they moved and retreated in disarray to the Berezina, losing people, convoys and equipment along the way. The condition of these divisions is described by the same captured German colonel Ratcliff: “In the Kopys area there were the remnants of the 25th motorized 78th assault and 337th infantry divisions. In total there were up to 15 thousand people. The headquarters of these divisions did not control the troops. The headquarters officers tried to be the first to cross the Dnieper.”

Units of the Red Army, operating in advanced detachments from the front - from Orsha, simultaneously moved into parallel pursuit along the Minsk highway. In cooperation with the partisans, they non-stop drove the enemy to the place of his final death - the Minsk region. The following entry from the diary of one German officer is typical for this stage of the battle: “The path of nightmares and horrors began. There are wild traffic jams on the roads. Stampede. Russian tanks block the paths of the infantry. Captain von Engel escaped. Russian aviation continuously sows death from the sky. The Russians are always ahead of us with parallel pursuit, the partisans are destroying bridges.”

Thus, during the six days of the offensive, under the attacks of Soviet troops, the powerful enemy defenses in the space between the Western Dvina and Pripyat fell. On June 27, the city of Orsha and the Orsha region were liberated from the invaders, which was important for the expulsion of the fascists from the entire territory of Soviet Belarus.

For the high combat skill demonstrated in the battles for the liberation of Orsha, the 41st military unit and formation were given the honorary name “Orsha”. During the liberation of the Orsha region, 7 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: senior sergeant Lazkov Nikolai Mikhailovich, sergeant Makeev Egor Abramovich, private Yurchenko Anton Stepanovich, Colonel Stebenev Fedor Aleksandrovich, tanker Mitt Sergei Mikhailovich, squadron commander of the Normandy-Niemen regiment, Frenchman Marcel Lefevre, junior sergeant Smirnov Yuri Vasilievich.

In 1978, a monument to the liberators of Orsha, erected in honor of the soldiers of the Red Army, partisans and underground fighters, was unveiled in the Central Square of the city. The monument was created according to the design of the architect V. Yagodnitsky and consists of two steles: a vertical one, topped with a flag, and a horizontal one - with three bas-reliefs and the names of the 41st formation and military units that liberated our city from the Nazi invaders.

On June 22, 1984, in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Belarus, Orsha was awarded an honorary award - the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, and in honor of this event, a memorial sign of the order was installed on the monument to the liberators of the city.

Chernyakhovsky Ivan Danilovich, who skillfully led the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front during the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, was thanked by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin dated June 27, 1944. In order No. 121 of the Commander-in-Chief there were the following words: “Today is June 27 at 22 o'clock, the capital of our homeland, Moscow, salutes the valiant troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, which captured the city of Orsha, with twenty artillery salvoes from 224 guns. Eternal glory to the Heroes who fell in battles for the freedom and independence of our Motherland! Death to the German invaders!

Liberated Orsha was complete ruins, ashes and fires... In Orsha, 4,578 residential buildings, all administrative, economic and cultural buildings were destroyed. Most of the factories were completely destroyed. The total damage to the city from the hard times of war amounted to two annual budgets of the BSSR in 1944 prices. Photo from the archives of the Zaslonov Museum

More than 75% of the city's buildings lay in ruins. The city, with a pre-war population of more than 63 thousand people, now had a little over 3 thousand people.

The occupiers also left a heavy legacy at the railway junction: locomotives and carriages frozen on the tracks, ruined stations and depots, disabled communications, damaged railway lines.

Orsha seemed extinct. The war and occupation set Orsha back by more than a century in terms of economic development. It seemed that it would take years and decades to restore what was destroyed. But time did not wait. First of all, it was necessary to restore the Orsha railway junction, since the Soviet armies advancing to the West needed ammunition, weapons, and equipment.

Every effort was made to restore the largest railway junction in Belarus. Many Zaslonov partisans returned to their depot. Steam locomotives, carriage workers, and railway workers worked day and night. The railway junction came to life. Five days after the liberation, the first Soviet train arrived in Orsha. And soon the trains went in all directions.

The war continued, but Orsha began to recover. Orsha residents cleared the rubble, filled up craters and trenches, and laid the first stones in the foundations of new buildings. Just two months after the expulsion of the invaders from Orsha, 5 industrial cooperative enterprises and 3 bakeries began distributing products in the city, 10 canteens, 7 shops, a bathhouse, and a hospital opened, classes began in schools, enrollments were announced for the railway technical school and medical school. The restoration of the flax mill, the Krasny Borets and Red October factories began. Overcoming enormous difficulties, the people of Orsha raised their hometown from ruins.

For more than 69 years we have lived under a peaceful sky. But the memory of those terrible events is still alive in our hearts. The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 left a terrible but heroic mark on the history of Orsha.

Near Orsha, the soldiers of the Red Army broke through the defenses, which the Germans had been building for almost three years and considered invincible. What is the Battle of Orsha famous for?

During the battle, they managed to find a weak link in the impregnable Panther fortress. The enemy did not expect that our troops would not be afraid of the swampy terrain and would go around the powerful fortifications. Thus, it was possible to dismember the flanks of the Orsha and Vitebsk fascist groups. They were forced to move along the Minsk highway. And then our aviation launched a devastating hunt for the mortally wounded Panther. The liberation of Orsha, without a doubt, accelerated the defeat of the Nazis in the Minsk region. The powerful fortified rampart "Panther" collapsed. The road has opened not only to the Belarusian capital, but to the west as a whole, in order to finish off the fascist beast in its lair.

The names of the heroes who defended the freedom and independence of our Motherland in battles will live forever in our hearts, and we must not forget about our duty, especially to those who gave their lives for the Motherland, for us.

Prepared by Sorotokina L.A., head of the Memorial Museum of Hero of the Soviet Union K.S. Zaslonov - a branch of the cultural institution “Museum Complex of History and Culture of the Orsha Region”

On June 27, 1944, during the Belarusian liberation operation “Bagration”, the city of Orsha was liberated from the Nazi invaders by the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

The years scorched by the Great Patriotic War are moving further into the past, years that brought suffering to people that cannot be measured by any measure. In its cruel, insatiable fire, the greatest troubles and suffering of all Soviet republics befell Belarus. For more than three years from 1941 to 1944, the Belarusian people languished under the yoke of enemy occupation. And only by the summer of 1944, a favorable situation developed on the Soviet-German front for the offensive actions of the Red Army, which firmly held the strategic initiative. The Soviet troops were given the task of defeating the central group of German troops - Army Group Center, liberating Belarus and reaching the state border of the USSR.

On June 23, 1944, the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky, stationed less than 40 km east of Orsha for almost a year, began to move. The operation to defeat the Nazi troops in Belarus began. The liberation of Vitebsk and Orsha was the task of the first stage of the operation, codenamed “Bagration”, named after the Russian hero of the war of 1812, who died on the Borodino field. The goal of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, which was carried out from June 23 to 28, 1944, was to defeat the troops of the left wing of the Nazi Army Group Center, defending in the Vitebsk-Lepel and Orsha directions. During this operation, Soviet troops advanced 80-150 km and encircled 5 enemy divisions in the Vitebsk area. The German command considered its defense in Belarus invincible.

The rear lines ran along the Orshitsa and Dnieper rivers to the village of Kopys. The latter was a system of trenches and reinforced concrete pillboxes. Exceptional attention was paid to strengthening Orsha itself. The city was surrounded by a perimeter of 2-3 trenches, reinforced with 40-50 pillboxes and bunkers. Stone buildings were adapted for defense, and the streets were lined with ditches. Civilians were herded into concentration camps in Orsha and worked in unbearable conditions to build a defensive rampart. The roads were littered with the dead.

For the construction of the Panther defensive rampart, tens of thousands of residential buildings and buildings were dismantled... For each section of the front in the area from Dubrovno to Kopys, there were 500 bayonets of personnel, 50 machine guns and 22 enemy guns per kilometer. This once again proved that a real impregnable fortress was built here. In addition, the German command took a subscription from all personnel: to die, but not to retreat without an order...

The Memorial Museum of the Hero of the Soviet Union K. S. Zaslonov contains the memoirs of Major D. Saulin (3rd Belorussian Front) - one of the participants in the Battle of Orsha, in which he describes in detail the events of those heroic days:

Despite the fact that large forces of infantry and tanks took part in the counterattack, the enemy was not successful. The German 26th Infantry Division, operating north of the 27th Army Corps, was by this time crushed and thrown back south to the Luchos River. As for the units of the 25th Motorized Division and the 110th Infantry Division, located to the south, they still continued to hold their positions. In the battles that broke out the next day, that is, June 25, our units in the area north of Orsha repelled numerous counterattacks, which were carried out by forces up to an infantry regiment, supported by tanks and self-propelled guns. At the same time, our attack increased. The enemy's rear defense line was broken through, and our troops advanced 15-20 km. Soviet mobile units poured into the resulting breakthrough and entered the operational space. At this stage of the battle, the Germans threw the main last army reserve into battle in the direction of Orehi-Vydritsa. Encounter battles ensued, during which the enemy suffered heavy losses and was overthrown. Rapidly developing their success, the Soviet troops did not allow the enemy to gain a foothold in pre-prepared intermediate positions. The captured commander of the assault 78th division, Lieutenant General Trout, said the following about this: “The Russians were hot on our heels. In many places they occupied new positions simultaneously with the advancing German units.”

As it turned out, Trout himself, fearing to finally lose his 195th regiment and reinforcements, gave the order to hastily retreat. This subsequently led to the exposure of the flank and rear of the German units defending south of the Dnieper. On the night of June 26, these enemy units, under the attacks of our troops, began to retreat beyond the Dnieper . Further events developed as follows: on the afternoon of June 26, our mobile units captured Kokhonovo and cut the railway and highway, the 27th German Corps lost its supply routes. This building found itself in a semi-encirclement.

Units of the Red Army, operating in advanced detachments from the front - from Orsha - simultaneously went into parallel pursuit along the Minsk highway. In cooperation with the partisans, they non-stop drove the enemy to the place of his final death - the Minsk region. The following entry from the diary of one German officer is typical for this stage of the battle: “The path of nightmares and horrors began. There are wild traffic jams on the roads. Stampede. Russian tanks block the paths of the infantry. Captain von Engel escaped. Russian aviation continuously sows death from the sky. The Russians are always ahead of us with parallel pursuit, the partisans are destroying bridges.”

The first to rush into the northwestern outskirts of Orsha were the soldiers of the 752nd Infantry Regiment under the command of Colonel Fyodor Aleksandrovich Stebenev (one of the streets of our city bears his name) from the 192nd Division. Tankers from the 213th Tank Brigade entered after them. Having defeated the Orsha garrison, formations of the 31st and 11th Guards Armies by 9 o'clock on June 27 completely captured the city and the railway junction of Orsha, crossed the Dnieper along the entire length of their offensive zone. In the battles for Orsha, two sapper soldiers distinguished themselves: the squad commander of the 381st separate sapper battalion, Sergeant E.A. Makeev and Private A.S. Yurchenko. They were the first to break through to the railway bridge trusses on the southern outskirts of the city, shoot a group of enemy demolitions and cut the wires leading to the planted explosives. The bridge was saved.

From the memoirs of Nina Yulievna Nikulina, born in 1920, now living in Orsha, who served in the Red Army from July 17, 1941 to September 6, 1945 with the military rank of senior lieutenant of the medical service as part of the sanitary unit of the 31st Army:

“... In June 1944, the heaviest battles for Orsha began. Our troops needed to capture bridges across the Dnieper and Orshitsa in order to enter Orsha. Every day in our hospital, our commissar by the name of Seledkin, who went through the entire war with us, covered for us the actions of the Red Army on the approaches to Orsha. We all understood that there was a large railway junction in Orsha, which had to be recaptured from the enemy at any cost. Having liberated Orsha, our troops opened up the road further to Borisov, Minsk, and Berlin. The city was all on fire. And only towards the end of the month our troops began to enter the outskirts of the city. The Germans were retreating, they used aviation. On the night of June 27 there was a heavy bombing of the railway station. All our surgeons were waiting for Orsha to be liberated, because the wounded were arriving in the thousands. The city was all on fire. Our field hospital was located 5 kilometers from Orsha. The ground shook from the shells. Our tents were constantly being shelled. Then a lot of people died, we were suffocating from the wounded, and some died right before our eyes, since we did not have enough time to provide them with first aid. The battles near Orsha were very difficult, the Nazis resisted strongly, until the last minute they could not believe that our troops would enter Orsha. But our valiant troops surrounded Orsha and defeated the enemy. We saw how Orsha was burning - it was a continuous fire, ruins and ruins were everywhere. In the center of the city, where pharmacy No. 4 is now located, there was a destroyed church, near which there were piles of bricks. In Orsha, at the railway station, we found a whole train with girls from Vitebsk, whom the Nazis did not manage to drive away to Germany. When they were released, they cried and kissed their liberators. Our field hospital went along with the 31st Army throughout the entire battlefield. There are battles, and we are saving wounded soldiers. They never stayed longer than the allotted time in the hospital. A little bit of wound healing - and to the front line. I want to say that our soldiers were very courageous and very kind. This was a special generation of people. They were very sympathetic to us doctors for our hard work.

Our 31st Army loved its commander, General Chernyakhovsky, very much. He was a young, talented, very cheerful person. When he died, we all grieved and took even more revenge on the enemy for his death. I am very pleased that in memory of him there is Chernyakhovsky Street in Orsha.

After the liberation of the city, we were not in Orsha for long. A few days later our troops began moving towards Borisov. When we left Orsha, there were only ruins before our eyes, in the center of the city there was complete devastation, there were very few residents on the streets of the city. This was really scary".

More than 75% of the city's buildings lay in ruins. The city, with a pre-war population of more than 63 thousand people, now had a little over 3 thousand people.

The occupiers also left a heavy legacy at the railway junction: locomotives and carriages frozen on the tracks, ruined stations and depots, disabled communications, damaged railway lines.

Near Orsha, the soldiers of the Red Army broke through the defenses, which the Germans had been building for almost three years and considered invincible. What is the Battle of Orsha famous for?

In 1978 In the Central Square of the city, a monument to the liberators of Orsha was unveiled, erected in honor of the soldiers of the Red Army, partisans and underground fighters. The monument was created according to the design of the architect V. Yagodnitsky and consists of two steles: a vertical one, topped with a flag, and a horizontal one - with three bas-reliefs and the names of the 41st formation and military units that liberated our city from the Nazi invaders.

Prepared by L. A. Sorotokina, head. department for core activities.

By June 22, 1944, preparations for a large operation of strategic importance in Belarus were completed. On June 22, Soviet troops conducted reconnaissance in force. The advanced battalions, supported by artillery fire and tanks, penetrated the defenses in a number of areas and captured the first enemy trenches.

On June 23, the main forces of the three Soviet fronts launched an offensive. The 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts delivered the main blows in the Vitebsk, Bogushevsky, and Orsha directions. The 2nd Belorussian Front was advancing in the Mogilev direction. The 1st Belorussian Front launched a decisive offensive a day later - June 24. Rokossovsky's armies delivered the main blow in the Bobruisk direction.

A unit of the 3rd Belorussian Front crosses the Luchesa River. June 1944

Vitebsk-Orsha operation

1st Baltic Front. During reconnaissance in force on June 22, the forward battalions of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps under the command of Major General Ruchkin from the 6th Guards Army (6 GA) broke through the enemy’s tactical defenses and advanced 4-6 km. A threat arose to the flank and rear of the German 9th Army Corps. The German command was forced to begin transferring part of the tactical reserves of the 9th Corps to the area east of Obol. As a result, the Germans were deprived of reserves on the first day, which facilitated the advance of the 6th Guards Army and 43rd Army. The forward battalions of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps 6 GA and the 1st Rifle Corps 43 A also achieved some successes by penetrating the enemy’s defenses.

The success of June 22 led to significant adjustments being made to the artillery offensive plan. Thus, in the 6th Civil Aviation, the time for artillery preparation was reduced and the amount of artillery involved was reduced by up to 50%. On the morning of June 23, the strike force of the 1st Baltic Front - the 6th Guards Army under the command of Chistyakov and the 43rd Army of Beloborodov - went on the offensive. The infantry, supported by close support tanks, aviation and artillery, broke through the enemy front in a 30 km area.

Soviet troops began to quickly advance in the western direction. The Germans tried to hold back the Soviet advance with artillery fire and infantry counterattacks with forces ranging from company to battalion, supported by groups of tanks of 3-8 vehicles. However, Soviet troops continued their offensive. The 1st Rifle Corps 43 A, with the support of units of the 6th Civil Aviation, bypassed the strong resistance center of Shumilino from the flanks and rear and, after a short but stubborn battle, captured the village. The garrison of the strong point was partly destroyed, partly surrendered.

Crew of the Soviet 122-mm howitzer M-30 in battle against German tanks. 3rd Belorussian Front

On the first day of the offensive, the Soviet command planned to bring Butkov's 1st Tank Corps into battle. He was supposed to advance in the general direction of Beshenkovichi. The corps began moving at 10 o'clock (it was located 14-18 km from the front line), but the rain significantly worsened movement on the roads, and outside them in swampy areas, tank movement was almost impossible. As a result, the tankers were unable to enter the battle before dark. By this time, infantry with support tanks were fighting in the area of inter-lake defiles west and southwest of Shumilin. Due to the significant delay and the presence of difficult terrain ahead - inter-lake defiles, the front commander Bagramyan prohibited the introduction of a tank corps into battle until the infantry had overcome the inter-lake defiles.

The 23rd Guards and 1st Rifle Corps advanced 16 km in a day. On the right flag of the 6th Civil Aviation Corps, the 22nd Guards Corps, overcoming stubborn resistance from enemy tactical reserves, advanced 2-7 km. On the same day, at the junction of the two guards corps, part of the forces of the 103rd Rifle Corps of the 6th Civil Aviation was brought into battle. The 2nd Guards Rifle Corps was concentrated for the offensive.

Cloudiness and variable rain somewhat limited the actions of Soviet aviation, but it flew 746 sorties (435 of them attack). The German Air Force on this day was limited to reconnaissance.

Commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan and the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General V.V. Kurasov during the Belarusian operation

Thus, already on the first day of the offensive of the strike group of the 1st Baltic Front, major successes were achieved. The enemy front was broken through. The German 9th Army Corps was defeated, its units, abandoning their equipment (6 tanks, 66 guns and other property were captured), hastily retreated to the western and southern banks of the Western Dvina. The German command tried to use the remnants of the corps and transferred reserves to create a stable defense in the Obol region and on the Western Dvina, preventing the gap from widening. The Soviet command, in order to maintain the pace of the offensive and prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on new lines, formed advanced mobile detachments, reinforced with tanks and artillery.

On June 24, the Soviet armies continued their offensive, widening the gap to 90 km along the front and 25-30 km in depth. The Germans resisted fiercely - Soviet troops repulsed 27 counterattacks. By the end of the day, the 6th GA reached the Western Dvina. The advanced detachments crossed the river on the move and captured small bridgeheads. The 43rd Army, continuing to advance in a southwestern direction, also reached the Western Dvina. The 1st Rifle Corps, under the command of Vasiliev, immediately occupied bridgeheads on the southern bank of the river. On the left flank of 43 A, units of the 92nd Rifle Corps broke through the German defenses and reached the distant approaches of Vitebsk (8 km north of the city). On the right flank of the front, the offensive of Malyshev’s 4th Shock Army was unsuccessful. The Germans put up stubborn resistance, and units of the 4th Shock Army were unable to break through the enemy’s defenses.

The 1st Tank Corps began moving towards the Western Dvina. However, the few roads became impassable after the rains; almost all the bridges were destroyed by the Germans and had to be restored. In addition, the roads were clogged with second echelons, artillery, pontoons and convoys of the advancing armies. Numerous traffic jams formed. Only after it was possible to organize the movement, tanks, artillery and pontoons were allowed forward. The tank corps reached the Western Dvina only at the end of the day and began preparations for crossing the river. The planes of the 3rd Air Army made 1,127 sorties that day (weather conditions improved).

By the end of the second day of the offensive, units of 43 A of the 1st Baltic Front and 39 A of the 3rd Belorussian Front reached the rear of the enemy’s Vitebsk group. The German command, trying to prevent a catastrophe that threatened the Vitebsk group and prevent the Red Army from crossing the Western Dvina, hastily pulled together reserves and troops from other directions. Two infantry divisions began to be transferred from the Idritsa direction to the Polotsk area; Two security divisions, as well as various sapper, construction, security, penal and other units, were deployed to the line of the Western Dvina. They began to transfer the 212th Infantry Division from the Pskov area.

Crossing of the Western Dvina. Units 6 GA and 43 A, without waiting for the pontoon formations to arrive, immediately began crossing the river on various available craft. Regimental and divisional artillery and part of the anti-tank artillery regiments and light cannon artillery brigades were transported on rafts shot down by the artillerymen themselves. This artillery played a big role in holding and expanding bridgeheads.

Crossing tanks across the Western Dvina. 1st Baltic Front

The German command, trying to stop the Soviet offensive at all costs, threw hastily assembled units into battle. The Soviet troops located on the bridgeheads were subjected to numerous violent counterattacks. However, German attacks failed to stop the Soviet advance. The crossing of Soviet units continued all day on June 25. Thus, the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps crossed the river and expanded the previously captured bridgehead. By the end of the day, sappers established pontoon crossings, which significantly speeded up the transfer of artillery and tanks. Units 6 GA and 43 A liberated the city of Beshenkovichi by the end of the day. Formations 43 A, together with the troops of the 39th Army, completed the encirclement of the Vitebsk enemy group. On the same day, a ferry was opened to transport the tank corps. It should be noted that the striking force of this corps could not be used in this operation.

On June 26, the troops of the front strike group fought 10-20 km. The German command tried to stop the Soviet offensive with the remnants of broken units and the introduction of new divisions (290th infantry and 221st security). During the day, Soviet troops repelled up to 30 counterattacks, each with a battalion to an infantry regiment supported by 10-12 tanks. The 43rd Army took part in the liquidation of the Vitebsk group with part of its forces. The Luftwaffe, as in previous days, was not active. Thus, on June 25-26, Bagramyan’s front solved the difficult task of crossing such a large water barrier as the Western Dvina. Less significant water barriers were also overcome - the Ulla and Svechanka rivers. The bridgehead was deepened to 18 km.

On June 27-28, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front developed an offensive in a western direction. The 100th Rifle Corps was included in the 4th Shock Army, and Malyshev’s army regrouped its forces for the subsequent attack on Polotsk. The 22nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 6th Civil Aviation took the strong enemy stronghold of Obolon. Troops of the 43rd Army, with the assistance of the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front, stormed an important stronghold and highway junction - Lepel. After crossing the Ulla River, the 1st Tank Corps, together with units of the 2nd Guards Corps of the 6th Civil Aviation, took the enemy stronghold of Kamen.

As a result, within six days of the offensive, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front successfully solved the task set by Headquarters. The front's strike group broke through the enemy's defenses, together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front destroyed the Vitebsk group, crossed the Western Dvina, Svechanka, Ulla and, having advanced 80 km with the left wing, occupied large Wehrmacht strongholds - Beshenkovichi and Lepel. During this time, Soviet troops destroyed more than 25 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, and a lot of military equipment, including 51 aircraft, 322 guns. More than 5 thousand people were captured; 474 guns, more than 1,400 vehicles and other weapons and equipment became Soviet trophies.

Offensive of the 3rd Belorussian Front

On June 22, in the afternoon, the forward battalions of the first echelon divisions of Krylov’s 5th Army, with the support of artillery, went on the offensive and, with a powerful, sudden blow, burst into the enemy’s first trench and captured it. Building on the first success, the advanced units advanced 2-4 km. At the same time, in the direction of the main attack, Soviet soldiers captured not only the first trench, but the second and third. The Germans counterattacked, trying to restore the situation, but their attacks were repulsed. In this direction, Soviet troops defeated two regiments of the 299th Infantry Division of the 6th Army Corps and a penal battalion.

At the same time, the advanced battalions of Galitsky's 11th Guards Army attacked the German positions. They advanced along the Minsk highway. The advanced units of the army burst into the first trench. However, they met strong resistance and were unable to advance further. Here German troops relied on well-fortified positions. The advanced battalions of Glagolev's 31st Army were not successful. In the Orsha direction, the defense was held by the German 78th Assault Division of the 27th Army Corps; it was well equipped and reinforced with about 50 assault guns.

Reconnaissance in force showed that the Germans had the weakest defense in the Bogushev direction. Five battalions of 5A penetrated deeply into the enemy’s defenses and captured several small bridgeheads on the Sukhodrovka River. At night, engineering units of 5A built three 60-ton bridges across the river to ferry tanks and artillery, and three light bridges for vehicles. In addition, already on the first day of the battle, the German command used all divisional reserves and the reserve of the 6th Corps - parts of the 14th Infantry Division - in the 5A offensive zone. As a result, the Germans did not have the strength to fend off the attack of the main forces of the 5th Soviet Army.

Battery of heavy howitzers B-4. 3rd Belorussian Front

On June 23, a powerful artillery strike was carried out on enemy positions. The first 5 minutes are a fire attack by all artillery, 105 minutes are the period of destruction of German defensive structures by targeted fire, 20 minutes are the destruction of fortifications by direct fire, and 40 minutes are the suppression of the front edge and the nearest depth. In zone 5A, changes were made to the artillery preparation: artillery fire was shifted deeper into the enemy’s defense.

15 minutes before the start of the assault on German positions, the Soviet Air Force launched a bombing attack on German troops. German fighters in groups of 4-6 aircraft tried to impede Soviet attacks, but without much success. The 1st Air Army maintained air superiority. In just one day, Soviet aircraft made 1,769 sorties, conducted 28 air battles and shot down 15 enemy aircraft.

At 9 o'clock, the Soviet infantry, with the support of tanks, went on the offensive along the entire front. Lyudnikov's 39th Army broke through the enemy front for 6 km and crossed the Luchesa River. At the forefront of the attack was the 5th Guards Rifle Corps. Advancing in a western direction, the Guards Corps advanced 12-13 km and intercepted the Vitebsk-Orsha railway. During the battle, the army defeated the 197th Infantry Division of the 6th Army Corps. The Germans' attempt to stop the Soviet advance with the help of part of the forces of the 95th Infantry Division failed. German troops were thrown back to the west.

Krylov's 5th Army delivered the main blow with its right flank. Here units of the 72nd and 65th Rifle Corps attacked. 5 A connections expanded the breakthrough to 35 km and advanced to a depth of 10 km. The army crossed Luchesa and cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway. Opposing 5 A, the 299th Infantry Division of the 6th Corps was defeated.

Galitsky's 11th Guards Army also broke through the enemy's defenses, advancing to a depth of 2 to 8 km. On the left flank, in the strip of the Minsk highway, Soviet troops met powerful enemy defenses. Therefore, the army command, with the permission of the front commander, decided to transfer the main attack from the left flank to the right, into the zone of the 16th Rifle Corps, where there was success.

Glagolev's 31st Army wedged 3 km into the enemy's defenses and fought stubborn battles with German troops. German infantry, supported by tanks, constantly counterattacked. In this direction, the German command advanced up to two infantry regiments from the reserve, reinforced with tanks and artillery.

As a result, the right flank of the front achieved the greatest successes. Units of the 39th and 5th armies broke through the German defenses 10-13 km deep and expanded the breakthrough to 30 km. The armies that attacked in the center and on the left flank encountered more serious enemy resistance. In addition, the enemy’s most developed defensive structures were located here. They penetrated the enemy's defenses, but were unable to break through.

On June 24, units of the 39th Army reached the Ostrovno area. Soviet troops intercepted the Wehrmacht's escape route from Vitebsk to the southwest. At the same time, units of the 84th Rifle Corps reached the eastern outskirts of the city. The Germans put up stubborn resistance. The 5th Army, overcoming the resistance of defeated divisions and arriving German reserves, advanced 10-14 km. At 21:00, after a powerful bombing attack carried out by 270 bombers and attack aircraft, Soviet soldiers, with a swift attack from the north, broke through the German defensive formations and stormed Bogushevsk, an important enemy stronghold. In this case, 24 guns were captured. Due to the success of 5A in its offensive zone, Oslikovsky’s cavalry-mechanized group was introduced into the breakthrough.

The 11th Guards Army, using the success achieved by the right flank, captured the regional center of Babinovichi and defeated several enemy regiments in its area. By the end of the day, the troops of the 11th Army had expanded the breakthrough to 30 km and advanced to a depth of 14 km. The 31st Army, repelling fierce enemy counterattacks, made little progress.

On June 25, Chernyakhovsky’s armies continued to develop their offensive. The left flank of 39 A reached the southern bank of the Western Dvina in the Dorogokupovo, Gnezdilovichi area. Here the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front united with the forces of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front. As a result, the encirclement ring around the enemy’s Vitebsk group was closed. In this regard, Tippelskirch noted that three divisions were cut off by the enemy and were soon destroyed. In fact, in the Vitebsk area, F. Gollwitzer’s 53rd Army Corps was surrounded - the 206th and 246th Infantry, the 6th Air Field Division and part of the 4th Air Field Division, as well as the 197th Infantry Division of the 6th Corps. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, Reinhardt, proposed to withdraw the troops, but Hitler initially prohibited the withdrawal of the corps, and when permission was received, it was too late.

At the same time, the center of 39 A captured the eastern part and center of Vitebsk with a decisive attack. The encircled German units launched up to 18 counterattacks against the 5th Guards Rifle Corps, desperately trying to break through to the west and southwest, but all enemy attacks were repulsed.

Oslikovsky's cavalry-mechanized group captured the city of Senno with a swift dash. KMG advanced units cut the Lepel-Orsha railway. The troops of the 5th Army, building on the success of the KMG, advanced 20 km, destroying scattered enemy detachments along the way. Army units liberated more than 100 settlements. In addition, taking into account the major success in the offensive zone of the 5th Army, where Soviet troops broke through all German defensive lines and broke into operational space, at the direction of the representative of the Headquarters Vasilevsky in the Bogushevsky direction, they decided to throw into battle the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Rotmistrov .

The 11th GA successfully advanced and broke through two fortified enemy lines. On June 25, in the offensive zone, 11 GA led the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps under the command of Burdeyny into a breakthrough. He received the task of intercepting German communications: the Minsk road northwest of Orsha and the Orsha-Lepel railway. The 31st Army on the right flank broke through the German defenses on the Dnieper.

Thus, in three offensives, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front completely broke through the German defenses. Soviet troops advanced to a depth of 30 to 50 km and at a front of 100 km. The Vitebsk and Orsha groups were separated, and five enemy divisions were surrounded in the Vitebsk area. Seven German divisions were defeated or suffered heavy losses. All this time, Soviet aviation firmly maintained air supremacy, destroying 52 enemy aircraft and making more than 2,500 thousand sorties just to attack or bomb enemy forces.

The German command, having lost the main defensive line and suffered defeat in the Vitebsk and Bogushevsk directions, withdrew the rear of the 3rd Tank and 4th Army to the line of the Berezina River. At the same time, the Germans tried to delay the advance of Soviet troops at intermediate lines. The German command began to introduce operational reserves into battle. The Germans continued to offer especially fierce resistance in the Orsha direction. Trying to hold the Minsk road, the German command transferred the 260th Infantry Division from the Kopys area and the 286th Security Division from the Tolochin area to this direction.

Fight near the station. Vitebsk

Liquidation of the Vitebsk group

Already on June 25, the Vitebsk group was divided into two parts. On the night of June 26, units of the 39th and 43rd armies completely liberated Vitebsk. During June 26, the surrounded group tried to break out of the encirclement. The Germans launched up to 22 counterattacks with forces of one to two regiments supported by tanks, assault guns and artillery. As a result of fierce fighting, part of the Vitebsk group with heavy losses escaped into the forests in the area of Lake Moshno. However, the narrow corridor was soon closed. Comfront Chernyakhovsky ordered three divisions of the 5th Army to turn around; the German group of about 5 thousand soldiers that had broken through was again surrounded around Lake Moszno.

In the afternoon of the 26th, units of the 39th and 43rd armies continued to be squeezed, surrounded by enemy groups. At the same time, the Soviet Air Force launched powerful bombing and assault attacks on them. On the morning of June 27, Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive and broke enemy resistance. Most of the Germans were destroyed. The commander of the 53rd Army Corps, Gollwitzer, his chief of staff, Colonel Shimidt, and a number of other senior officers surrendered. Among those who surrendered were divisional commanders: Müller-Büllow (246th Infantry Division), Hitter (206th Infantry Division).

One German group - the remnants of the 4th airfield division of General R. Pistorius and other units (about 8 thousand people in total) was able to break through in the direction of Beshenkovichi. However, it ran into the forces of the 1st Baltic Front and was destroyed in the Yakubovshchina region. Specially designated detachments of Soviet divisions continued to pursue and destroy small enemy groups until June 28. As a result, the Germans lost 20 thousand people killed and 10 thousand prisoners. The entire Vitebsk enemy group was destroyed. Thus, according to V. Haupt, only two hundred people from the 53rd Army Corps broke through to the German units, and the 6th Corps was defeated and suffered heavy losses.

Member of the Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front V. E. Makarov, A. M. Vasilevsky and I. D. Chernyakhovsky interrogate the commander of the 206th Infantry Division A. Hitter

Representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky is interrogated by the commander of the 53rd Army Corps, General of Infantry F. Gollwitzer, and the commander of the 206th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General A. Hitter

Defeat of the Orsha group

The cavalry-mechanized group continued to develop the offensive in the western and southwestern directions. Oslikovsky's cavalrymen liberated Oboltsy and Smolyany from the Nazis, creating a threat from the northern direction to the Orsha Wehrmacht group. Rotmistrov's army liberated Tolochin. As a result, the main communications of German troops in the Orsha area were cut. The Germans tried to recapture Tolochin with strong counterattacks, but were unsuccessful.

At the same time, Burdeyny's 2nd Guards Tank Corps intercepted the Minsk road 15 km northwest of Orsha and continued moving in a southerly direction. On June 26, the 11th Civil Aviation reached the northwestern outskirts of Orsha. 31 And she took the strong enemy stronghold of Dubrovno. Thus, Soviet troops created a threat to the northern flank and rear of the Orsha group. German counterattacks were unsuccessful. It was necessary to withdraw the troops so that they would not suffer the fate of the Vitebsk group.

On the morning of June 27, 31 A broke through the outer defense belt of Orsha and broke into the city. Troops of the 11th Civil Aviation also took part in the liberation of the city. Soon the city was liberated from the enemy. On the same day, Rotmistrov’s tankers, developing an offensive along the Minsk road, liberated Bobr, Krupki and reached the Borisov area. Oslikovsky's cavalry-mechanized group reached the area south of Kholopenichy. On June 28, front troops marched from 22 to 38 km. Oslikovsky's KMG assisted the forces of the 1st Baltic Front in the liberation of Lepel and reached the Berezina.

The defeated troops of the German 3rd tank and 4th armies retreated with their left flank and center to the Berezina. At the same time, the right wing continued to put up stubborn resistance, trying to hold Borisov and cover the withdrawal of the Mogilev group, which was defending itself in front of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Thus, units of Rotmistrov’s tank army collided with formations of the German 5th Tank Division, which had been transferred to the Borisov direction.

German retreat from Orsha

Results

During the five days of the offensive, the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts completely completed the tasks assigned to them. The northern flank of Army Group Center was destroyed, and thus the Red Army took the first step towards the destruction of the entire Minsk group.

The 1st Baltic Front under the command of Bagramyan broke through the enemy’s defenses, crossed the Western Dvina, liberated Beshenkovichi and Lepel, contributed to the liberation of Vitebsk and the destruction of the enemy’s Vitebsk group.

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Chernyakhovsky broke through the enemy’s defenses, destroyed the enemy’s Vitebsk group, and defeated the Orsha group. Orsha, Vitebsk and more than 1,600 settlements were liberated. Soviet troops advanced 115 km in depth, creating a breakthrough of 150 km along the front.

The German 53rd Army Corps was destroyed or captured, and the 6th and 9th Army Corps suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. The Germans lost more than 40 thousand people in killed alone, and captured more than 18 thousand soldiers and officers. 126 tanks and assault guns, more than 1 thousand guns and mortars, etc. were destroyed. Soviet trophies included about 70 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.1 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3 thousand vehicles, 32 locomotives, more than 1 ,5 thousand carriages, 255 warehouses with weapons, ammunition, provisions, equipment, etc. Soviet aviation destroyed over 70 German aircraft in air battles and on the ground.

Sappers clear mines in Vitebsk

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Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to prepare and consistently conduct a series of strategic offensive operations over a vast area from the Arctic to the Black Sea. At the first stage of the campaign (June - August), it was planned to deliver powerful blows and one by one defeat large enemy groups: first on the Karelian Isthmus and in South Karelia, then on the central sector of the front, in Belarus, and then in the western regions of Ukraine, on the Lvov-Sandomierz direction. At the second stage (September - November) it was planned to conduct operations in the Balkans, the Baltic states and the Far North.

Naturally, the Wehrmacht Supreme Command was also preparing for the summer-autumn campaign. But when assessing the possible actions of the Red Army, it made a serious miscalculation, believing that the main events would unfold not in the central, but in the southwestern direction. The Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff of the Red Army skillfully took advantage of this mistake.

In the plans of the Supreme Command Headquarters, priority in the future campaign was given to the central section of the Soviet-German front. The liberation of Belarus was possible only if such a large enemy grouping as Army Group Center was destroyed (Field Marshal E. von Busch, from June 28 - Field Marshal V. Model). It, together with the right-flank formations of the 16th Army of Army Group North and the left-flank formations of the 4th Tank Army of Army Group Northern Ukraine, numbered 1.2 million people, 9.5 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns. They were supported and covered by about 1,350 aircraft of the 6th and parts of the forces of the 1st and 4th Air Fleets. The main enemy forces were concentrated in the areas of Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Kovel, where they covered the most accessible directions for attack. The enemy occupied a pre-prepared defense in depth (250–270 km) and had the task of firmly holding the Belarusian ledge, or, as the enemy called it, the “balcony,” along which the shortest routes to the German borders passed. However, the enemy, misled and not expecting the main blow of the Red Army troops in Belarus, had insufficient reserves here, and some of them were constrained by the actions of the partisans.

On May 20, 1944, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General A.I. Antonov introduced I.V. Stalin received a plan that provided for a simultaneous breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses in six sectors, dismemberment of his troops and defeat in parts. Particular importance was attached to the elimination of the most powerful enemy flank groupings in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, rapid advance to Minsk, encirclement and destruction of the main enemy forces east of Minsk at a depth of 200–300 km. The Soviet troops had to step up attacks and expand the front of the offensive, relentlessly pursuing the enemy, not allowing him to gain a foothold on intermediate lines. As a result of the successful implementation of the operation plan, called Operation Bagration, it was planned to liberate all of Belarus, reach the coast of the Baltic Sea and the borders of East Prussia, cut through the enemy’s front, and create favorable conditions for attacks on him in the Baltic states.

The 1st Baltic (Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan), 3rd Belorussian (Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 2nd Belorussian (Colonel General, from July 28 - Army General G.F.) were involved in the operation . Zakharov), 1st Belorussian (Army General, from June 29 Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) fronts and the Dnieper Military Flotilla (Captain 1st Rank V.V. Grigoriev); in total more than 2.4 million people, 36 thousand guns and mortars, 5,200 tanks and self-propelled guns. They were supported by the 1st (Colonel General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin), 3rd (Colonel General of Aviation N.F. Papivin), 4th (Colonel General of Aviation K.A. Vershinin), 6th (Colonel General of Aviation F.P. Polynin), 16th (Colonel General of Aviation S.I. Rudenko) air armies; a total of 5,300 aircraft; Long-range aviation was also involved (Marshal, from August 19 - Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov) - 1007 aircraft and aviation of the country's Air Defense Forces - 500 fighters. The partisans interacted closely with the troops.

May 30 I.V. Stalin finally approved the plan for Operation Bagration, which was decided to begin on June 19–20. No major changes were made to the plan. Her plan remained the same. To Marshal G.K. Zhukov was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, and Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky - 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts.

The idea of the Belarusian strategic offensive operation at the initial stage was to defeat enemy troops on the flanks of the Belarusian salient. And subsequently - in delivering powerful cutting strikes in converging directions towards Minsk, encircling and destroying the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, it was planned to develop an offensive along the entire front from the Western Dvina to Pripyat, with access to the borders of East Prussia and the banks of the Vistula. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front, in cooperation with formations of the 3rd Belorussian Front, were supposed to strike on the northern flank of the Belarusian ledge, encircle and destroy the Vitebsk enemy group and reach the Chashniki-Lepel area. It was assumed that at the same time the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front would defeat the enemy’s Bogushevsko-Orsha grouping, delivering the main blow in the direction of Orsha, Borisov, Minsk.

The formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front, advancing in the Mogilev direction, were supposed to pin down the main forces of the enemy’s 4th Army and not give it the opportunity to retreat beyond Minsk until it was completely surrounded by troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front surrounded and destroyed the enemy's Bobruisk group and subsequently attacked Minsk from the southeast in cooperation with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

In order to misinform the enemy, the fronts were ordered to create at least three defensive lines at a depth of 40 km. Settlements adapted to perimeter defense. Front-line, army and division newspapers published materials on defensive topics. As a result, the enemy's attention was largely diverted from the upcoming offensive. Radio silence was strictly observed among the troops, and a narrow circle of people was involved in the development of the operation plan. Only six people knew the full plan of Operation Bagration: the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, his deputy, the chief of the General Staff and his first deputy, the head of the Operations Directorate and one of his deputies. The regrouping of troops was carried out in compliance with all camouflage measures. All movements were carried out only at night and in small groups.

In order to give the enemy the impression that the main blow would be delivered in the summer in the south, at the direction of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, a false group consisting of 9 rifle divisions, reinforced with tanks and artillery, was created on the right wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, north of Chisinau. In this area, mock-ups of tanks and anti-aircraft artillery guns were installed, and fighter jets patrolled the air.

As a result, the enemy failed to reveal neither the plan of the Soviet Supreme High Command, nor the scale of the upcoming offensive, nor the direction of the main attack. Therefore, Hitler kept 24 formations south of Polesie from 34 tank and mechanized divisions.

According to intelligence data, the 53rd and 6th Army Corps of the 3rd Tank Army and the 27th Army Corps of the 4th Field Army were defending in front of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Vitebsk and Bogushevsk directions. They were part of Army Group Center. During the operation, the enemy could bring up strategic reserves and strengthen Army Group Center by an additional 50% with artillery, tanks, aircraft and people. Half of them may end up against the 3rd Belorussian Front.

During the preparatory period, all types of reconnaissance established that the enemy’s tactical defense zone included two stripes. The first strip has two or three positions, each of which has two or three continuous trenches. The second lane is less prepared. In addition, defensive lines were created in the operational depth, especially along the banks of the Berezina and Shchara rivers. One of the vulnerable aspects of the enemy’s defense was the insufficient echeloning of the operational formation of Army Group Center. The infantry was mainly located on the first defensive line.

In total, at the beginning of the operation, the 3rd Belorussian Front consisted of 1,169 tanks, 641 self-propelled guns, 1,175 anti-tank guns (45 mm and 57 mm), 2,893 guns (76 mm and above), 3,552 mortars, 689 rocket artillery installations, 792 anti-aircraft guns , 1864 aircraft. Without taking into account army and front-line logistics institutions and units, there were almost 390 thousand people at the front.

At the first stage of Operation Bagration, the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Baltic and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, was supposed to defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk-Orsha grouping. The Supreme Command headquarters determined the direction of Orsha and Minsk as the direction of the main attack. However, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, taking into account the presence of powerful enemy defensive lines here, managed to convince I.V. Stalin in the need to deliver two main blows simultaneously. The second attack was planned to be carried out in the direction of Liozno, Bogushevsk at the junction between the flanks of the enemy’s 3rd Tank and 4th Armies. There was a certain risk in this: the defense here was weaker, but the swampy terrain made it difficult to use the main striking force of the front - tanks. To implement his plan, General Chernyakhovsky asked to strengthen the front with one tank army. Stalin met him halfway and ordered the 5th Guards Tank Army and the RGK breakthrough artillery division to be transferred to the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

On the night of May 31, private directives and instructions were sent to the Belarusian fronts to immediately begin preparations for the offensive. Stalin approved the plan for the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation without comments. Directive No. 220115 of the Supreme Command Headquarters to the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front stated:

“The headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. Prepare and conduct an operation with the goal, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the river. Berezina, why break through the enemy’s defenses by delivering two blows:

a) one strike by the forces of the 39th and 5th armies from the area west of Liozno in the general direction of Bogushevskoye, Senno; part of the forces of this group to advance in the north-west direction, bypassing Vitebsk from the south-west, with the goal of, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front, defeating the enemy’s Vitebsk group and capturing the city of Vitebsk;

b) another attack by the 11th Guards. and the 31st Army along the Minsk highway in the general direction to Borisov; part of the forces of this group to capture the city of Orsha with a blow from the north.

2. The immediate task of the front troops is to capture the Senno-Orsha line. In the future, develop the attack on Borisov with the task, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy’s Borisov grouping and reach the western bank of the river. Berezina in the Borisov region.

3. Use mobile troops (cavalry, tanks) to develop success after a breakthrough in the general direction of Borisov...

6. Readiness and start of the offensive - according to the instructions of Marshal Vasilevsky...” .

To the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan was ordered, in cooperation with the 3rd Belorussian Front, to cross the Western Dvina and capture the Beshenkovichi region, together with his right wing, defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk group and capture the city of Vitebsk. Further develop the offensive in the general direction towards Lepel, firmly securing the main grouping of the front from the Polotsk direction.

In accordance with the decision of General Chernyakhovsky, approved by Stalin, the front headquarters on June 20 made clarifications to the operation plan. The operational formation of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was planned to be in two echelons. Four combined arms armies (39th, 5th, 31st, 11th Guards) were allocated to the first echelon, since the enemy stretched his main forces on the main defensive line 6–8 km deep and only minor reserves were located in the operational zone. The second echelon included the 5th Guards Tank Army and a cavalry mechanized group. At the same time, the tank army had to prepare to enter the battle in the directions of Orsha, Borisov and Liozno, Bogushevsk. Cavalry mechanized group with infantry reaching the river line. Luchesa was introduced into the breakthrough in the direction of Liozno and Bogushevsk. The total width of areas for breaking through enemy defenses was determined to be 33 km, or 23.6% of the total width of the strip occupied by front troops. The length of the breakthrough areas in the armies varied. Thus, the 39th Army was supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses in an area 6 km wide, the 31st - about 7 km, and the 5th and 11th Guards Armies - 10 km each. In order to ensure success, the following were concentrated in the army breakthrough areas: 5764 guns and mortars, or 80.1% of the total number of guns; 1466 tanks and self-propelled guns, or 80.9% of the total. This made it possible to have high densities on 1 km of front - up to 175 guns and mortars, 44 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The duration of artillery preparation was determined to be 2 hours 20 minutes. Artillery support for the attack was planned to be carried out with a single barrage of fire in combination with a sequential concentration of fire to a depth of 1.5–2 km. Artillery support for the entry of mobile formations into the breakthrough was planned to be carried out by additionally reinforcing them with artillery and involving army groups. Aviation of the 1st Air Army was to conduct preliminary and direct air preparation for the offensive, and then provide its support and escort; fight enemy aircraft in the air and strike enemy airfields.

Particular attention was paid to maintaining the strictest secrecy in the preparation of the operation. For this purpose, the front headquarters determined the procedure and timing for the delivery of tasks from subordinates, the occupation of the starting position by troops, the time for shooting artillery, and changing command and observation posts. It was prohibited to publish any documents on the preparation of the operation and to use technical means of communication for this purpose. Newly arriving troops were to use only mobile means of communication, and formations and units that had previously been part of the front, during regroupings, had to leave working radio stations temporarily at the points of their previous deployment. Written front directives for the operation were prepared by June 20. Upon receipt of them, army commanders were allowed to issue their orders or directives.

On June 12, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Marshal of the Armored Forces P.A., arrived at the front. Rotmistrov. Headquarters representative Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky and front commander General I.D. Chernyakhovsky carefully worked out with him questions about the place and timing of the concentration of army troops, reconnaissance of possible directions of its actions.

“Preparation for your task is in full swing, with the smallest details being worked out. The available troops will certainly be ready by the time you specify. Everyone has complete confidence in success. There are still concerns about the timely approach by rail of the 4th and 15th artillery brigades, Oslikovsky's cavalry corps, ammunition, fuel and Rotmistrov's formations... Once again I report that the final start date entirely depends on the work of the railways, for our part We have done and are doing everything to meet the deadlines you set." .

On the morning of June 14, Stalin informed Vasilevsky that due to delays in rail transportation, the start of the operation was postponed to June 23.

On June 18, Marshal Vasilevsky arrived in Moscow, where at a meeting with Stalin he once again agreed on the introduction of the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle in the Orsha-Borisov direction, as the shortest and most favorable terrain for maneuver. “Having listened to my brief report on the progress of the preparation of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts to carry out the tasks assigned to us,” Vasilevsky recalled, “Stalin was pleased and especially focused on the use of the 5th Guards Tank Army on the Chernyakhovsky front. I reported that in the Orsha-Borisov direction against the 11th Guards Army, the enemy’s defense in engineering terms is much more developed than in the 5th Army sector, and the grouping of enemy troops there is much denser. Therefore, I considered the Orsha direction for introducing a tank army into a breakthrough into the Borisov direction less promising than the Bogushev-Borisov direction. We agreed that we would temporarily consider the Orsha-Borisov direction to be the main direction for introducing the tank army into the breakthrough, as it is the shortest and, due to the nature of the terrain, the most convenient for maneuver. The final decision was postponed until the first days of the operation. Therefore, it was agreed that the 5th Guards Tank Army would remain in the reserve of the Headquarters for now, and at the right moment I, as a representative of the Headquarters, would give instructions to transfer it to the front. At the same time, the Headquarters stipulated that in all cases the main task of the tank army was to quickly reach the Berezina River, capture the crossings and liberate the city of Borisov.”

On the night of June 20, partisan detachments operating in Belarus began an operation to massively undermine rails, destroying 40,865 rails in three days. As a result, enemy transportation on many sections of the railways was partially paralyzed.

On June 22, in the entire zone of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts, reconnaissance in force was carried out by the forward battalions, which in a number of areas penetrated the enemy’s defenses from 1.5 to 8 km and forced him to bring divisional and partially corps reserves into battle. The forward battalions met stubborn enemy resistance in the Orsha direction. The commander of the 4th Army reported to Field Marshal von Busch that Soviet troops were attacking positions in the direction of Orsha with large forces. The army commander, lacking accurate data and overestimating the strength of the 3rd Belorussian Front, made an irreparable mistake. The headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army received a message that an attack by Soviet troops in the Vitebsk direction had been successfully repulsed.

Field Marshal von Busch continued to consider Orsha and Minsk the main direction. He ruled out the possibility of an offensive by large Russian forces in the Bogushev direction, in swampy terrain and many lakes, and focused his main attention on the Minsk highway. Bush ordered the commander of the 4th Army to bring divisional reserves into battle and stop the advance of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front towards Orsha. Bush did not yet realize that General Chernyakhovsky had misled him by passing off reconnaissance in force as the beginning of a general offensive in order to reveal the enemy’s defense fire system.

There was less than a day left before the decisive offensive. Aviation carried out powerful attacks on enemy reserves and airfields in the areas of Orsha, Borisov and Minsk. On the night of June 23, the weather changed dramatically. The weather had been dry and hot all day, and then it rained heavily. In the morning artillery preparation began. The enemy, mistaking the reconnaissance in force carried out the day before for a general offensive, moved reserves into the tactical defense zone, thereby exposing his troops to the artillery and aviation of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The front's strike force, consisting of the main forces of the 11th Guards and 31st Armies, encountered fierce resistance from the enemy in the Orsha direction, who occupied a deeply echeloned defense with long-term structures. By the end of the day, both armies managed to advance only 2 to 8 km. By one o'clock in the afternoon, troops of the 39th Army cut the Vitebsk-Orsha railway in the area of Zamostochye station.

The official report of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht on June 23 noted: “On the central sector of the front, the Bolsheviks began the offensive we had expected... Fierce fighting is still going on on both sides of Vitebsk...”. Ernst von Busch admitted in the evening of the same day: “A major offensive north-west of Vitebsk meant... complete surprise, since until now we had not imagined that the enemy could concentrate such large forces in front of us.”

On the morning of June 24, the troops of the 11th Guards Army, after fierce fighting, overcame the swamps and reached the rear defensive line of the enemy, covering the Vitebsk-Orsha highway.

The offensive of the 5th Army in the Bogushev direction developed successfully. On June 25, her troops occupied Bogushevsk, which was a junction connecting the defenses of Orsha and Vitebsk, and, as it were, the castle of the entire Vaterland line in this region. Troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the river. Western Dvina in the Beshenkovichi, Gnezdilovichi sector, and formations of the 6th Guards Army crossed the river.

The commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, convinced that the 11th Guards Army would not be able to complete the breakthrough of the enemy defense by the morning of June 25, decided to introduce General Oslikovsky’s mechanized cavalry group into the battle in the Bogushevsky direction in the 5th Army zone. Having successfully overcome the wooded and swampy terrain, on June 25 she occupied the city of Senno and cut the Orsha-Lepel railway. Using its success, the troops of the 5th Army advanced west to 20 km.

At eight o'clock in the evening on June 24, the 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred from the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters to the command of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. General Chernyakhovsky decided to take it to a waiting area at night, regroup it in the 5th Army zone and, at dawn on June 26, introduce it into a breakthrough also in the Bogushev direction. Stalin approved the decision of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, about which Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky reported to the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army. “I must note that Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov reacted to the decision of Headquarters (both on the transfer of his army from Headquarters to the front, and on changing the direction of its entry into the breakthrough) without much enthusiasm,” Vasilevsky noted. – This did not escape the attention of front commander I.D. Chernyakhovsky. The true reasons for this are unknown to me, and it would hardly be right to attach special importance to this, if not for the fact that the 5th Guards Tank Army, which always performed brilliantly, in this case acted worse than before.”

On June 26, troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army entered the breakthrough. Its advance detachment, using a wide maneuver, bypassed the resisting enemy groups and by half past two days reached the area east of Tolochin. An attempt to immediately shoot down the units of the security division defending here failed. The main forces of the 3rd Kotelnichesky Guards Tank Corps, advancing after the advance detachment, were 20 km away. Corps commander Major General I.A. Vovchenko, following the front commander’s directive ordering mobile troops to introduce second echelons and reserves, did not give the enemy time to regroup and bring up their reserves. As a result, he managed to quickly deploy the main forces of the corps on the approaches to Tolochin. The enemy did not expect Soviet troops to appear here. The corps, having maneuvered with the forces of one tank brigade bypassing Tolochin from the north and the other from the south, cut off the enemy’s path to the west and prevented the withdrawal of his Orsha group to Tolochin. As a result of this maneuver, by the evening of June 26, Tolochin was captured. Front troops cut the Orsha-Borisov highway and railway for 30 km and captured a large number of trophies.

In the direction of operations of the 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, events did not develop so successfully. Parts of the corps advanced slowly, with heavy losses. In order to find out the reasons for the slowdown in the offensive, Chernyakhovsky sent a special commission to the corps. She determined that the enemy widely used ambushes in battles against corps units. General I.I. Lyudnikov, a participant in the investigation into the circumstances of one of these battles, made the following conclusion: “The Germans in some areas used our tactics against us, which were once successfully used by Katukov, then a colonel, in battles against Guderian’s tanks on the distant approaches to Moscow: attack from ambushes ..." .

Despite all the difficulties, the sudden introduction of a tank army into the battle had a decisive influence on the outcome of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation. The troops of the 11th Guards and 31st armies were finishing overcoming enemy defenses in the Orsha region. On the morning of June 26, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of General A.S. was introduced into the zone of the 11th Guards Army. Burdeyny, who began to bypass Orsha from the north-west. V. von Haupt, assessing the progress of Operation Bagration, noted: “On the twenty-sixth of June, the remaining armies of Army Group Center also fought the last battles in their history.”

On the evening of June 27, troops of the 11th Guards and 31st armies, with the support of formations of the 1st Air Army and long-range aviation, liberated Orsha. In the zone of the 1st Baltic Front, the troops of the 43rd Army, having crossed the Western Dvina on June 25, by the end of the day reached the Gnezdilovichi area and entered into contact with the troops of the 39th Army, part of whose forces broke into Vitebsk from the east. The next day, Vitebsk was liberated, and by three o’clock in the afternoon on June 27, the enemy group was completely eliminated, over 19 thousand people surrendered.

The formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army, during their further advance to Borisov, met stubborn resistance from the enemy's 5th Tank and 253rd Infantry Divisions that arrived from near Kovel. By the end of the day on June 28, the cavalry mechanized group of General Oslikovsky captured the crossings on the Berezina, only 14 km northwest of Borisov.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the left wing of Army Group Center was defeated. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, having advanced 80–150 km, created a wide gap in the enemy defenses and created conditions for the rapid development of the offensive in the Minsk and Vilnius directions. The gates to Belarus were open. According to the front headquarters, during the operation the 246th, 106th, 4th and 6th airfield divisions were surrounded and completely destroyed, the 299th, 14th, 95th, 197th infantry divisions were defeated, and major losses were inflicted on the 256th th, 260th Infantry, 286th Security Divisions and a number of individual units. The enemy lost 41.7 thousand soldiers and officers, 126 tanks and self-propelled guns, 796 guns, 290 mortars, 1840 vehicles. About 17.8 thousand people were captured, 36 tanks, 33 self-propelled guns, 652 guns, 514 mortars, 3,300 vehicles, 225 warehouses with military equipment were taken as trophies.

The features of the operation were: a quick breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone due to the skillful choice of directions for the main attacks, their sudden delivery, and the timely introduction of second echelons and mobile groups into the battle; encirclement and destruction of the enemy’s Vitebsk grouping in the tactical and immediate operational zones of its defense by rifle divisions without the participation of tank formations. At the same time, during the offensive, the following shortcomings emerged: the lag of the bulk of the reinforcement artillery during the development of the offensive in operational depth; delay in the supply of ammunition and fuel due to the low rate of restoration of bridges and weak leadership of the commandant service.




	Eastern Belarus
	Victory of the USSR
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
A. M. Vasilevsky	Georg Reinhardt
I. Kh. Bagramyan	Kurt von Tippelskirch
I. D. Chernyakhovsky
Strengths of the parties
1st Baltic Front: 359 thousand people, 4900 guns and mortars, 687 tanks and self-propelled guns	Unknown
3rd Belorussian Front: 579 thousand people, 8412 guns and mortars, 689 rocket artillery installations, 1169 tanks, 641 self-propelled guns, 1864 combat aircraft

Unknown	Unknown

(Belorussian. Vitsebsk-Arshanskaya aperatsiya (June 22 - June 28, 1944) - a strategic military operation of the armed forces of the USSR against German troops during the Great Patriotic War, carried out in Eastern Belarus, with the aim of collapsing the defense of the right flank of Army Group Center. It is a component part of the Belarusian operation (Operation Bagration).

Plans of the parties

USSR

As part of the Belarusian offensive operation, troops of the 1st Baltic Front were aimed through Polotsk, Glubokoe, Shvenchenys (Sventsyany) - to Siauliai, cutting off the German Army Group North from Army Group Center and reaching the Baltic in the Klaipeda region; The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, after defeating the enemy in the area of Vitebsk and Orsha and attacking Borisov, were sent through Minsk, Molodechno, Vilnius, Kaunas, Lida and Grodno to the borders of East Prussia.

At the first stage of the Belarusian operation, the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts were tasked with “defeating the Vitebsk group, introducing tank and mechanized troops into the breakthrough and developing the main attack to the west, covering the Borisov-Minsk group of German troops with its left flank group.”

Headquarters directives called for two strikes.

One - with the forces of the 39th and 5th armies (3rd Belorussian Front) “from the area west of Liozno in the general direction to Bogushevsk, Senno”, part of the forces bypassing Vitebsk from the southwest in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front (6th Guards and 43rd armies, which struck in the general direction of Beshenkovichi, Chashniki). As a result, the Vitebsk enemy group was to be defeated and Vitebsk was taken.

The 43rd Army (1st Baltic Front) was supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Novaya Igumenshchina - Toshnik section in the general direction of Shumilino and, having broken through the enemy’s main line of defense on the second day of the operation, seize bridgeheads on the southern bank of the Western Dvina.

The 39th Army (3rd Belorussian Front), with the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps, struck from the Makarov - Yazykovo front in the general direction of Pesochna, Plissa, Gnezdilovichi and was supposed to connect with the troops of the 1st Baltic Front in the Ostrovno area and capture the city Vitebsk.

The 5th Army (3rd Belorussian Front) was supposed to strike from the Efremenki-Yulkovo section in the direction of Bogushevskoye. With access to the Luchesa River, the army had to ensure the introduction of a cavalry-mechanized group into the breakthrough.

Another blow - by the 11th Guards and 31st armies (3rd Belorussian Front) should be delivered against the Orsha enemy group and further along the Minsk highway in the general direction of Borisov. Part of the forces of this group was supposed to capture the city of Orsha with a blow from the north. It was proposed to use the mobile forces of the front (cavalry and tanks) to develop success in the general direction to Borisov “with the task, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy’s Borisov grouping and reach the western bank of the river. Berezina in the Borisov region."

The 11th Guards Army (3rd Belorussian Front) with the forces of 9 rifle divisions was supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Yuryev Island - Kireeva area and move along the Smolensk - Minsk highway in the direction of Tolochin, Borisov with the goal of defeat together with the troops of the 5th and 31st th armies Orsha-Bogushevskaya group of the enemy. By the end of the third day of the offensive, the army was supposed to reach the Yanovo-Molotany-Lamachin line. And by the end of the 10th day - go to the Berezina River in the area of \u200b\u200bBorisov and to the north of it.

The 31st Army was supposed to, with the help of 6 rifle divisions, break through the enemy defenses in the Kireeva (claim) - Zagvazdino sector, strike on both banks of the Dnieper in the direction of the city of Orsha and then advance on Vorontsevichi and Vydritsa.

The cavalry-mechanized group was supposed to be introduced into a breakthrough in the direction of Bogushevskoye - Senno (from the positions of the 5th Army), and the 5th Guards Tank Army - in the strip of the Minsk highway (positions of the 11th Guards Army) in the direction of Borisov. By the end of the 6th day of the operation, they were supposed to secure bridgeheads on the western bank of the Berezina River in order to further develop the attack on Minsk.

The 4th Shock Army was supposed to attack Polotsk.

Balance of power

USSR

1st Baltic Front (commander of the Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, chief of staff Colonel General V. V. Kurasov, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General D. S. Leonov)

4th Shock Army (commander: Lieutenant General P. F. Malyshev, Chief of Staff, Major General A. I. Kudryashov, member of the Military Council, Major General T. Ya. Belik)
6th Guards Army (commander Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov)
43rd Army (commander Lieutenant General A.P. Beloborodov, chief of staff Major General F.F. Maslennikov, member of the Military Council Major General S.I. Shabalov. The payroll as of 06/01/1944 was 64,920 people (at full-time - 108,575 people).
1st Tank Corps (commander Lieutenant General of Tank Forces V.V. Butkov)
3rd Air Army (commanded by Lieutenant General of Aviation N.F. Papivin). By the beginning of the operation, it had 1094 aircraft (bombers - 73, attack aircraft - 368, fighters - 403, reconnaissance aircraft - 20, spotters - 32, transport and communications - 198).

3rd Belorussian Front (commander of the Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, chief of staff Lieutenant General Colonel General A. P. Pokrovsky, member of the Military Council Lieutenant General V. E. Makarov)

5th Army (commander Lieutenant General N.I. Krylov)
11th Guards Army (commander Lieutenant General K. N. Galitsky)
31st Army (commanded by Lieutenant General V.V. Glagolev)
39th Army (commander Lieutenant General I. I. Lyudnikov)
5th Guards Tank Army (Commander Marshal of Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov)
2nd Guards Tatsin Tank Corps (guard commander, Major General of Armored Forces A. S. Burdeyny)
Cavalry mechanized group (guard commander, Major General N. S. Oslikovsky)

3rd Guards Stalingrad Mechanized Corps (commander Lieutenant General V. T. Obukhov)
3rd Guards Cavalry Corps (guard commander Major General N. S. Oslikovsky, chief of staff Colonel S. T. Shmuylo)

1st Air Army (commanded by Lieutenant General of Aviation M. M. Gromov)

long-range aviation units

coordinated the actions of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky

Germany

parts of Army Group Center (commander Field Marshal Ernst von Busch)

3rd Panzer Army (commander Colonel General Georg Reinhardt)

6th Army Corps (commander General of Infantry Georg Pfeiffer, from 06/28/1944 - General of Artillery Helmut Weidling)
9th Army Corps (commander: Infantry General Rolf Wuthmann)
53rd Army Corps (commander General of Infantry Friedrich Gollwitzer)

4th Army (commanded by Infantry General Kurt von Tippelskirch)

12th Army Corps (commander Lieutenant General Vinzenz Müller)
27th Army Corps (commanded by Infantry General Paul Völkers)
39th Panzer Corps (commander General of Artillery Robert Martinek, from 06/28/1944 - Lieutenant General Otto Schünemann, from 06/29/1944 - General of Panzer Forces Dietrich von Saucken)

units of the 6th Air Fleet (commander Colonel General Robert Ritter von Greim)

parts of Army Group North (commander Colonel General Georg Lindemann)

16th Army (Commander: General of Artillery Christian Hansen)

1st Army Corps (commanded by Infantry General Karl Hilpert)

units of the 1st Air Fleet (commander General Kurt Pflugbeil)

General progress of the operation

The key point in the operation to liberate Vitebsk was the crossing to the left bank of the Western Dvina. The crossing was carried out simultaneously at several points, in particular, in the area of the bridge, which now bears the name of F. T. Blokhin, in the area of the village of Zaborye and in the area of the settlement of Shumilino.

Results of the operation

As a result of the operation, the regional centers of the Vitebsk region Shumilino (June 23), Beshenkovichi, Bogushevsk, Senno (June 25), Tolochin (June 26), Orsha, Chashniki (June 27), Lepel (June 28) were liberated.

Individual episodes

On June 26, 1944, Comrade Begenov Meirman (Meerman) Merzabekovich burst into Orsha and opened fire on the German echelon

Then he destroyed the escaping train... From June 21 to June 25, 1944, Corporal Begenov suppressed several enemy heavy machine guns and up to twenty Germans with his anti-aircraft heavy machine gun.

Rescue of the bridge by Fyodor Blokhin

The commander of the sapper platoon, Senior Sergeant Fyodor Blokhin, was tasked with saving the only surviving bridge in the city from destruction, so that the main forces of the 39th Army, which was liberating Vitebsk, could then cross it. The success of this mission was largely predetermined by the fact that the day before Blokhin received news of the death of his beloved son in battle. Blokhin, at first extremely upset by the death of his son, then carried out this task with triple energy.

The operation to save the bridge was preceded by street fighting in the center of Vitebsk on the night of June 26 by the 875th Regiment of the 158th Infantry Division. A platoon of 12 people led by Senior Sergeant Blokhin infiltrated through enemy formations in the early morning darkness and reached the Western Dvina. The bridge was mined and could be blown up at any moment. The key to success was the surprise of the attack and the speed of the operation. At the commander’s signal, the soldiers threw grenades at the enemy’s trenches and burst onto the bridge. A battle ensued, which turned into hand-to-hand combat. Senior Sergeant Blokhin struck down the Nazi who blocked his path with a knife, and rushed to the water, where the wires leading to the landmines were stretched, after which he cut them and, together with Corporal Mikhail Kuznetsov, removed the electric detonator. Sappers removed 300 boxes of explosives from the bridge supports. At this moment, Soviet tanks were already approaching the bridge.

Attack of the 215th Infantry Regiment under the command of N.B. Borisova

In the area of the village of Zaborye, the commander of the 215th Infantry Regiment of the 179th Infantry Division of the 43rd Army, Borisov N.B. was tasked with seizing a bridgehead on the left bank of the Western Dvina and firmly gaining a foothold on it. Having assessed the situation, Borisov came to the conclusion that after capturing the bridgehead, it was necessary not to defend, but to attack, and that capturing the village of Zaborye would be the best way to facilitate the successful crossing of the Western Dvina with the main forces of the regiment. In a swift attack, Borisov's battalion captured the village of Zaborye and in 3 days of fighting destroyed 400 German soldiers and officers (including a colonel), captured 65 prisoners, up to 80 vehicles, 20 motorcycles, 1 rifle battery, 13 machine guns, 7 warehouses (including 5 with food). The battalion lost 3 people. The operation was carried out so successfully that later, using the example of Borisov, officers were taught how to defeat the enemy “with little blood, with a mighty blow.”

Bespyatov crossing in the Shumilino area

In the area of the populated center of Shumilino, the 935th Infantry Regiment of the 306th Infantry Division of the 43rd Army under the command of A. I. Bespyatov broke through the German defense by crossing the Western Dvina under heavy enemy fire. Bespyatov's regiment was the first to capture a bridgehead on the left bank of the Western Dvina, expanded it, and this area then became an army crossing. After crossing the Western Dvina, part of the troops of the 43rd Army joined the 39th Army, while the other continued to advance west towards the city of Lepel. Not far from this city, Bespyatov’s regiment surrounded the SS battalion and completely destroyed it.

The feat of mortarman Borodulin

During the Vitebsk operation, the Katyusha gunner, a fighter of the 3rd Separate Guards Mortar Regiment, S.D. Borodulin, distinguished himself, for whom the battle near Vitebsk was his last. His Katyusha at the crossing of the small Obolyanka River was attacked by the enemy from a nearby forest. Although the Katyusha mortar was not designed for direct fire, the mortarmen decided to take the fight and brought down heavy fire on the Germans. The Nazis used artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns. From the explosion of the shell, Borodulin's Katyusha caught fire, the combat crew, consisting of several fighters, was burned and choked by smoke. According to surviving eyewitnesses, Borodulin said, “We’ll die, but we won’t let the goats through!” managed to fire one more, final salvo at the Nazis. Borodulin Sergei Dmitrievich, driver-senior driver of the guard combat installation, senior sergeant Nazarenko Pavel Ivanovich, and commander of the M-8 gun of the guard, sergeant Svetlichny Timofey Ivanovich, burned down along with the installation.

Feat of Yuri Smirnov

The commander of a section of the 77th Guards Rifle Regiment (26th Guards Rifle Division, 11th Guards Army, 3rd Belorussian Front) Guard, junior sergeant Yuri Smirnov, on the night of June 25, 1944, was part of a tank landing force breaking through enemy defenses on Orsha direction. In the battle for the village of Shalashino, Orsha district, Vitebsk region of Belarus, he was seriously wounded and captured by the enemy. The Nazis subjected the Soviet soldier to brutal torture, but the courageous fighter did not reveal military secrets to the enemy. The Nazis crucified Yuri Smirnov on the wall of the dugout, and stabbed his body with bayonets.

Guard junior sergeant Yu. V. Smirnov died a hero’s death, remaining faithful to his soldier’s duty and military oath until the last minute of his life. His feat serves as an example of soldier's valor and selfless loyalty to the Motherland.

Assault on Heights "Cemetery"

In June 1944, Guard Lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike took command of a machine gun company of the 56th Guards Rifle Regiment, 19th Guards Division, 5th Guards Rifle Corps.

At 6 o'clock in the morning on the 20th of June, after a 3-hour artillery raid, the 5th Guards Rifle Corps occupied 3 lines of fortifications of the Nazi invaders, but further enemy counterattacks did not allow them to advance further. In front of the 56th Guards Rifle Regiment, on a hill, there was a cemetery, which was the dominant height on the battlefield. All attacks to this height were repulsed by the enemy. There were heavy losses of tanks and self-propelled guns when trying to occupy this height.

The regiment commander set a combat mission for the Guard, Lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike: “Gather combat guards officers and soldiers. Create an assault company and take the cemetery." . Guard Lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike understood that the order was difficult to carry out, but when using tactics and combat experience, as well as knowledge of the enemy’s psychology, a bold decision was made: install machine guns in such a way as to provide strong and targeted fire to accompany the assault company during the enemy’s withdrawal to dinner.

The remaining enemy machine gunners on duty could not stop the attacks of the Soviet guards, at the head of the company shouting “Hurray!” Guard Lieutenant Karymshakov Keldike was walking with his close friend of the Guard, Senior Lieutenant Innokenty Pavlov. Height "Cemetery" was taken almost without losses. The fighting continued until the evening. The enemy, leaving cover groups, began to retreat. The Soviet Guards continued the battle and pursuit of the enemy in order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold at the next line.

Awards and memory

For success and heroism during the Vitebsk operation, Fyodor Timofeevich Blokhin, Nikolai Borisovich Borisov, Alexey Ivanovich Bespyatov, Yuri Vasilievich Smirnov and Sergei Dmitrievich Borodulin were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Near the entrance to the bridge saved by Senior Sergeant Blokhin, there is a memorial plaque with an inscription perpetuating his feat. F. T. Blokhin is an Honorary Citizen of Vitebsk.

For the breakthrough of the Vitebsk fortified area and the liberation of Vitebsk, in accordance with the orders of the Supreme High Command of July 2 and 10, 1944, 62 formations and units of the 39th, 43rd and 1st Air Armies of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic received the name “Vitebsk” fronts.

For steadfastness during the defense of the city of Orsha in accordance with Unit Order No.: 65/n dated: 08/05/1944, Issued: 36 Guards. sk / Awarded the Order of the Great Patriotic War, II degree, commander of the heavy machine gun crew of the Guard, Corporal Begenov Meirman (Meerman) Merzabekovich

Commemorative medals

20 years since the liberation of Vitebsk. (1964, A.F. Kovalev, V.A. Mitrichev, Vitebsk Watch Factory);
25 years since the liberation of Vitebsk. (1969, A.E. Khatkevich, Vitebsk Electrical Instruments Plant);
25 years since the liberation of Vitebsk from the Nazi invaders. (1969, G. F. Klikushkin, Cultural Goods Factory);
30 years since the liberation of Vitebsk from the Nazi invaders. (1974, S. N. Kompanichenko, Vitebsk Electrical Instruments Plant)